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“It is the uninformed traders who provide the liquidity to the informed, and so
understanding their behavior can provide substantial insight and intuition into the
trading process...(an) open question is what traders can learn from other pieces of
market data, such as prices” —O’Hara (2001)
1. Introduction
Though raised by O’Hara for more than a decade ago, our understanding of
uninformed traders’ behavior and what traders can learn from market information
is still very limited, in particular in limit order markets, which are the dominant
financial markets. Because of information asymmetry and growing complexity in
order flows and trading in limit order markets, the current literature mainly focuses
on the behavior of informed traders and simplifies the behavior of uninformed traders
by introducing private value (Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2009)) or time preference
(Rosu (2014)) to exogenously determine the trading strategies of uninformed traders.
In this paper, we focus on the behavior heterogeneity between informed and un-
informed traders when they share the same learning algorithms. Different from
informed traders, uninformed traders have delayed information about the funda-
mental value. To examine how traders process market information, we introduce
a genetic algorithm (henceforth GA) learning with a classifier system to classify
market information into different groups according to market conditions. By com-
bining information processing and order choice (limit/market orders to buy/sell) into
the trading strategy, the behavior heterogeneity of traders is endogenously emerged
from their learning and trading. Put differently, we allow trader to co-evolve trading
strategies with gain information from short term price movement and, most impor-
tantly, the state of the order book itself. We show that, measured by the average
usage of different group of market information, the trading strategies under the GA
learning become stationary in long run. This helps us to understand the effect of
learning on order profit, information efficiency, order submission and liquidity. We
find that, with respect to information process, market information is more useful for
uninformed traders than informed traders, in particular informed traders pay more
attention to the last transaction sign while uninformed trader pay more attention
to some technical rules. With respect to the impact on the market, learning of
uninformed traders improves market information efficiency, which is not necessarily
the case when informed traders learn. With respect to order submission, learning
makes uninformed traders submit less aggressive limit orders but more market or-
ders and patient limit orders, while it makes informed traders submit less market
orders and more aggressive limit orders. The results provide some insight into the
3
information processing and order submission behavior of traders when they learn
from market information in limit order markets. They also lead to an implication
on the probability of informed trading (PIN).
This paper contributes to the literature of market microstructure in limit order
markets and agent-based computational finance with adaptive learning by integrat-
ing them into a unified framework to address the open question from O’Hara. In
the literature of market microstructure in limit order markets, the endogenous order
choice based on the order book conditions is a core and challenging issue, as high-
lighted by Rosu (2012).1 In particular, modeling a dynamic limit order book is very
challenging. As pointed out by Goettler et al. (2009) (p.68), “a model that incorpo-
rates the relevant frictions of limit-order markets (such as discrete prices, staggered
trader arrivals, and asymmetric information) does not readily admit a closed-form
solution.” To overcome this challenge, we introduce a GA learning with classified
rules into a limit order market. Within this framework, a trading strategy con-
tains two parts: market conditions and actions. The market conditions may include
market information of bid, ask, mid-price (the bid-ask midpoint), historical prices,
order book depth and the transaction sign of last market order. Classified rules,
such as “the current ask is lower than the last ask”, are used for traders to process
order book information. The actions may include buy/sell at market/limit orders.
For example, one trading strategy could be: “when the current ask is lower than
the last ask and the current bid-ask spread is smaller than before, traders choose
a market buy”. Trading strategies are then evolved according to the GA based on
their historical performance. When a trader enters the market, he/she chooses the
best strategies from the selected candidates that match the current market condi-
tions. In this way, the GA allows traders to learn from their historical experience
and endogenously make order choice according to the current market conditions.
We show that, measured by the average usage frequency of different groups of infor-
mation, trading strategies becomes stationary under the GA learning in long run,
demonstrating the effectiveness of the learning. We also show that, with the GA
learning, the average usage of all groups of information is higher for uninformed
traders than for informed traders. In general, the order profit/loss of traders is
improved/reduced and the learning is more valuable for uninformed traders than
for informed traders. Among all the market information, informed traders use more
information of the last transaction sign, while uninformed traders use more informa-
tion related to technical rules. Furthermore, traders submit more limit orders than
market orders and the learning reduces the bid-ask spread; however, the learning
makes informed traders submit less market orders and more aggressive limit orders
1 Rosu (2014) solves the stationary equilibrium by assuming that traders can continuously
monitor the market and reenter the market to modify their limit orders freely at anytime.
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while uninformed traders submit less aggressive limit orders but more market or-
ders and limit orders at or away the quotes. Moreover, by using the information of
the last transaction sign, informed traders improve their order profit, submit more
market orders and hence consume more liquidity but reduce the bid-ask spread.
By using the technical rules, uninformed traders reduce their loss, market informa-
tion efficiency is improved but the bid-ask spread becomes wider. In a robustness
analysis, we find that private value for uninformed traders can affect traders’ trad-
ing strategies and limit order market significantly in short-run, but not in long-run.
This result is different from Goettler et al. (2009) who find that private value mainly
determines the order submission of uninformed traders. This result of endogenous
order choice provides insight into how traders process order book information and
how the learning affects the market liquidity through traders’ order submission.
This paper also contributes to the literature of agent-based computational finance
with adaptive learning.2 On the one hand, two surveys of Chen, Chang and Du
(2012) and Gould, Porter, Williams, Fenn and Howison (2013) have pointed out that
after several prototypes have successfully replicated a number of financial stylized
facts of the low frequency data, the next milestone is to see whether the agent-
based model can also be used to replicate the features either in the high frequency
domain or the features in market microstructure, which may be considered as the
two missions of the second-generation agent-based financial models. While there are
some limited progresses made for the first mission,3 little progress has been made for
the second. While there will be another long journey ahead in the second mission,
this paper provides a framework within which many details (such as asymmetric
information, learning and order choice) can be articulated. On the other hand,
though adaptive learning has been widely used in financial markets, for example, a
series papers based on the SFI-ASM (Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer and Tayler
(1997)) and BH (Brock and Hommes (1998)) models. However, in most of these
agent-based models with adaptive learning, the evolution of trading strategies is
largely driven by the market price instead of the fundamental value, which is the
focus of the microstructure literature in limit order markets. This difference from
most of the agent-based financial models with adaptive learning brings a different
dynamics.4 We find that the GA learning from uninformed traders improves market
information efficiency, which is not necessarily the case when informed traders learn.
2We thank anonymous referees for suggestions of highlighting this aspect and the following
discussions.
3See Chiarella, He, Shi and Wei (2014) and the references cited there for the latest development
in this direction.
4In our model, large bubble and crash would not happen when the GA learning becomes effective,
though market price can deviate from the fundamental value when the learning is driven by traders’
order profits.
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This result is very interesting and new to the literature.5 The framework allows us
to capture the effect of asymmetric information, which is the focus in the market
microstructure literature since Kyle (1985) and to fill the gap between agent-based
computational finance and mainstream market microstructure.
A robustness analysis on the fraction of informed traders leads to an interesting
implication to the probability of informed trading (PIN). We find that the PIN
is positively related to market volatility and the bid-ask spread, but negatively
related to the ratio of market volatility to the bid-ask spread. This provides a useful
implication for estimating the PIN in limit order markets.
Related literature—This paper is part of a growing literature in limit order
market models with asymmetric information and agent-based models with adaptive
learning. For limit order market models, some early static models of limit order mar-
kets assume that informed traders only use market orders and uninformed traders
or liquidity traders only use limit orders (see, for example, Glosten (1994) and Seppi
(1994)). Empirical studies find that both informed and uninformed traders use a
mixture of market orders and limit orders.6 For more discussion about the choice of
order type, we refer the reader to Parlour and Seppi (2008) and Rosu (2012). There
are a few papers explain how the traders determine their order choice under asym-
metric information. Menkhoff et al. (2010) empirically find that informed traders’
order choice is sensitive to market conditions including the bid-ask spread, volatility,
momentum of order flow and order book depth. Goettler et al. (2009) and Rosu
(2014) introduce two dynamic models that allow informed and uninformed traders
to determine their choice of order type in limit order markets. Goettler et al. (2009)
assume that information is short-lived, so informed and uninformed traders choose
buy or sell and order type by a trade-off among private value,7 the expected order
profit and pick-off risk. By assuming that uninformed traders have high private
value while informed traders have zero private value, the trading strategies of the
uninformed traders are mainly determined exogenously by the private value instead
of asymmetric information. Rosu (2014) assumes that information is long-lived and
traders’ buy-sell decision and the time preference of order submission are exoge-
nously determined. He finds that in equilibrium, the patient informed traders also
5Some models, such as Kluger and McBride (2011) and Anufriev, Arifovich, Ledyard and
Panchenko (2013), find that adaptive learning improve market efficiency in limit order markets.
6See, for example, Keim and Madhavan (1995), Chakravarty and Holden (1995), Harris (1998),
Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2005), Kaniel and Liu (2006), Menkhoff, Osler and Schmeling (2010)
and Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2013).
7According to Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005), the private value is not the private informa-
tion, it reflects idiosyncratic motives for trade (such as wealth shocks, tax exposures, or hedging
and portfolio rebalancing needs).
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submit market orders when the price deviates far from fundamental value. There-
fore the order submission behaviors in these two models depend highly on exogenous
parameters, such as private value and time preference. Due to analytical intractabil-
ity, their models focus on stationary equilibrium and do not consider how traders
learn from historical market information and do not allow traders to choose trading
strategies endogenously based on the market conditions. Moreover, they assume
that once the traders accomplish their transactions, they exit the market forever.
This setup does not allow traders to learn from their trading experience. Empirically
Nicolosi, Peng and Zhu (2009) find that traders learn from their trading experience,
consequently adjust their behavior and effectively improve their investment perfor-
mance. By introducing the GA learning with a classifier system, we allow traders to
reenter the market to trade time after time and learn from their trading experience.
This paper uses the GA to model traders’ adaptive learning and evolution of
trading strategies.8 Since introduced first by Holland (1975), GA has been used in
agent-based models to examine learning and evolution in financial markets. The
GA is a search heuristic that mimics the process of natural selection. It generates
solutions to optimization problems using techniques inspired by natural evolution,
such as selection, crossover and mutation. In the initial stage, the GA randomly
generates some solutions, which are evaluated by their performance. The GA then
uses selection, crossover and mutation to evolve the solutions based on the survival
of the fittest, and creates new solutions from solutions with better historical perfor-
mance to replace under-performed solutions. In this way, the GA generates optimal
sets of solutions to the changes in the environment. Early studies include Arifovic
(1996), SFI-ASM (Arthur et al. (1997)) and Routledge (1999, 2001). Recently, to
generate some intraday trading patterns in limit order markets, Kluger and McBride
(2011) allow both informed and uninformed traders using a GA to decide when to
enter the market during a trading day.
The classifier systems have been introduced in economic models, such as Marimon,
McGrattan and Sargent (1990), Allen and Carroll (2001), Lettau and Uhlig (1999),
and SFI-ASM models (such as Arthur et al. (1997), LeBaron, Arthur and Palmer
(1999). More recently, Wei, Zhang, He and Zhang (2013) introduce a classifier
systems to a GA learning model of the limit order book under a similar information
structure to Goettler et al. (2009). It allows part of the uninformed traders to learn
8Other models with adaptive learning include Chakrabarti and Roll (2012) who use the Bayesian
learning in a sequential game in a market for a single asset with fixed aggregate supply, and Pouget
(2007) who employs experience weighted attraction learning in a call market and a Walrasian
tatonnement market; both find that adaptive learning is useful for traders. In limit order book
markets, LeBaron and Yamamoto (2008) employ GA to capture the imitation behaviour among
heterogenous beliefs. Moreover, Darley and Outkin (2007) use adaptive learning to evolve trading
strategies of market makers and apply their simulations to the Nasdaq market in 1998.
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and to forecast the current fundamental value by using GA. They show that the
learning of uninformed traders improves information dissemination efficiency. More
important, it provides a method on how to use a classifier system to describe the limit
order market conditions, so that traders can optimize their forecasting rules based
on market information. This paper extends the classifier system used in Wei et al.
(2013) and introduces more detailed market conditions. As far as we know this is
the first paper to apply classifier systems in a simulated microstructure environment
trying to use it to convert states of the order book into order submission.9
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the limit order
market model and GA learning. Section 3 examines the evolution dynamics of
trading strategies and analyzes the evolution of the usage of different groups of
information. Section 4 focuses on the effect of learning on order profit, information
efficiency, the bid-ask spread and order submission. Section 5 provides a robustness
analysis on private value, slow evolution speed of GA and an implication to the
PIN models. Section 6 concludes. A further robustness analysis on the fundamental
volatility, the market share of informed traders, the information lag, and the weight
on the recent profit in the performance measure of the GA are provided in the
Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider a continuous double auction limit order market model of trading
a single risky asset. Traders are either informed or uninformed and their trad-
ing strategies are generated and updated endogenously through genetic algorithm
learning as follows.
2.1. The limit order market. There are N risk neutral traders including NI
informed and NU uninformed traders with NI + NU = N . Each trader arrives at
the market according to a Poisson process with parameter λ. The informed traders
know the fundamental values when they arrive at the market. The information is
short-lived, meaning that uninformed traders know the fundamental values with a
time lag τ > 0, called information lag or information-lived time. There is a risky
asset and a trading time period t, defined by (t− 1, t], corresponds to a short time
interval such as one minute in the real market. The fundamental value vt of the
risky asset follows a random walk process with an initial value of vo. Innovations
in the fundamental value vt occur according to a Poisson process with parameter
φ. When an innovation occurs, the fundamental value either increases or decreases
by κ tick sizes with equal probability. Depending on the value of the parameter
9We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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φ, innovations may occur several times in one time period (when φ > 1). All the
informed traders who enter the market in time period t know the (same) fundamental
value vt; however the uninformed traders know the fundamental value vt−τ with
τ > 0 measured in units of a time period.10 When entering the market, traders
submit orders to buy or sell at most one unit of the asset.11 Transactions take place
based on the standard price and time priorities in limit order markets.
When a trader enters the market at time t′ ∈ (t−1, t] of time period t, he observes
market information of history transaction prices and the current limit order book,
including the best bid bt′ and ask at′ prices,
12 the mid-price pmt′ = (at′ + bt′)/2,
the spread st′ = at′ − bt′ , the depths of the limit order book such as the depth at
the best bid dbt′ and the best ask d
a
t′ , the depth of the buy side d
buy
t′ and the sell
side dsellt′ , and the average market price over the last τ periods defined by p̄t,τ =
[pt−1 + pt−2 + · · ·+ pt−τ ]/τ , here pt−1 is the last transaction price in time t− 1, and
we let pt = pt−1 if there is no transaction between time t− 1 and t. The trader also
knows if the last transacted order was a buy or sell initiated transaction (denoted
by p±t′ , + for a buy and - for a sell order). To reduce pick-off risk, the limit order
expires in time D, which is set to be one trading day. To incorporate the learning,
instead of assuming that traders can have at most one opportunity to trade as in the
literature, we allow traders to reenter the market according to the Poisson process
with parameter λ. Upon reentry, traders cancel their previous limit orders and
submits new orders.
2.2. Trading strategies. Because of growing complexity of order flow, it is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for traders in particular uninformed traders to find the
best trading strategy to trade in order to make profit or reduce loss. To overcome
this challenge, we introduce a genetic algorithm (GA) with a classifier system as a
learning mechanism for traders to learn and trade.
When a trader arrives at the market, he uses a GA to learn from market infor-
mation, plus the private information about the fundamental value if the trader is
informed, and chooses the best trading strategies to buy or sell one share with ei-
ther a market order or a limit order (to be specified later). The difference between
10The fundamental value and information structure follow Goettler et al. (2009).
11 As pointed out by Rosu (2012), most of limit order market models assumes risk-neutral traders
with order size of one. To endogenize the order size decision and order-choice with asymmetric
information is an important but complicated issue. This has been partially examined in Chiarella,
Iori and Perellò (2009) with an exogenous order submission rule under symmetric information.
12Here t′ refers to a trading time during the one minute time period. In some extreme case,
with very small probability, either the buy or sell limit order book could be empty. To facilitate
trading, we let at′ = 1.01pt′′ if the sell limit order book is empty and bt′ = 0.99pt′′ if the buy limit
order book is empty; here t
′′
denotes the previous time when the best quote is available.
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informed and uninformed traders is that the trading decisions for informed traders
to buy or sell are determined by their private information of the fundamental value,
but it becomes part of the learning for uninformed traders.
The learning mechanism of GA is based on the principles of natural selection. The
outcome or solution of GA learning is called a chromosome, which is evaluated based
on its historical performance and selectively evolved through processes of selection,
crossover and mutation (to be explained in the latter half of this subsection). In the
framework of Arthur et al. (1997), a classifier system is introduced so that an agent
can recognize market conditions and choose the chromosome accordingly. Motivated
by Arthur et al. (1997), we develop a classifier system as part of trading strategies
to characterize market conditions and the limit order book. For each trader, a
trading strategy i contains two components. The first component corresponds to
market conditions xi (say, for example, the current mid-price pmt′ is higher than the
expected fundamental value vjt of trader j ) and the second component is an action y
i
of buying or selling one unit of the stock at either a market or limit order. The trader
then chooses the best trading strategy according to its strength mainly determined
by its historical performance (to be specified later). We now provide some details
about the two components of a trading strategy based on the GA learning.
As the first component, the market condition xi is characterized by classified
rules (CRs) of the classifier system on the most important market information when
traders make their decisions. There are a lot of information in limit order markets
and the types of information we consider are mainly motivated by Goettler et al.
(2009), Menkhoff et al. (2010) and Wei et al. (2013). Goettler et al. (2009) find
that information about the change in ask/bid, the last transaction price, the last
transaction sign (buy or sell), the depths at the quote and away from the quote
significantly affects the expectation of the fundamental value for uninformed traders.
Menkhoff et al. (2010) find that the order submission of informed traders is affected
by the bid-ask spreads, volatility, momentum of order flow and order book depth.
Chung, Gao, Lu and Mizrach (2013) find that the last transaction sign and the
order book depth can significantly influence the short-term movement of return. The
classifier system developed in the following extends the one introduced in Wei et al.
(2013) who find that the forecasting accuracy of uninformed traders improves when
they use the GA to learn from the lagged fundamental value, historical prices and
the mid-price. In this paper, we consider information on the expected fundamental
value, mid-price, historical prices and the order book information including recent
change in quotes and the bid-ask spread, and order book depth imbalance and
introduce ten CRs listed in Table 1 to classify market conditions.
The CRs in Table 1 are grouped based on five different types of market infor-
mation. The first group, “Fundamental Value” (FV) contains the classified rule
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Table 1. The classified rules (CRs) based on expected fundamen-
tal value (Group FV, CR1), technical rules (Group TR, from CR2
to CR4), recent change in quotes and bid-ask spread (Group QS,
from CR5 to CR7), order book depth imbalance (Group DI, CR8 and
CR9),and the last transaction sign (Group TS, CR10). Here vjt = vt
for informed traders and vjt = vt−τ for uninformed traders.
Group Num CR Description
FV CR1 pmt′ > v
j
t The mid-price is higher than the expected fundamental
value.
TR CR2 p̄t,τ > v
j
t The average market price of last τ periods is higher than
the expected fundament value.
CR3 pmt′ > p̄t,τ The mid-price is higher than the average market price of
last τ periods.
CR4 p̄t,τ/2 > p̄t,τ The average market price of last τ/2 periods is higher
than the average market price of last τ .
QS CR5 st′ > st′′ The current spread is larger than the last spread.
CR6 at′ > at′′ The current ask is higher than the last ask.
CR7 bt′ > bt′′ The current bid is higher than the last bid.
DI CR8 dat′ > d
b
t′ The current depth of the ask is larger than the current
depth at the bid.
CR9 dsellt′ > d
buy
t′ The current depth of the sell side is larger than the
current depth of the buy side.
TS CR10 p±
t′′
Last transaction sign (last market order is buy or sell).
CR1 describing the relations between the expected fundamental value and the mid-
price; the second group, “Technical Rules” TR, contains CR2 to CR4, describing
the technical rules among the mid-price, the expected fundamental value and the
average market prices of the last τ/2 and τ periods; the third group, “Quotes and
Spread” (QS), contains CR5 to CR7 describing the recent change in the quotes and
the bid-ask spread; the fourth group, “Depth Imbalance” (DI), contains CR8 to
CR9, describing limit order book imbalance; and the last group, “Transaction Sign”
(TS), contains CR10 describing the last transaction sign.13 We use binary strings
to represent CRs and hence market conditions. For example, for CR1, “1” indicates
that CR1 is true and “0” means that CR1 is false. Hence one binary string has 10
bits and every bit represents two states of each CR, for example, “101110 01101”
13If we let the agent consider all the information of the limit order book and prices of the past
τ periods, the agent may learn better, but it leaves the set of classified rules too large and the
learning more complicated. In our model, agents are bounded rational, and they can process part
of information of the limit order book. In the classifier system, the average prices and the order
book depth reflect part of information of past τ periods.
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indicates one possible market condition. Hence, there are totally 210 = 1024 market
conditions.
In principle, a trader needs at least 1,024 trading strategies to match all the market
conditions. However, in some cases, some market information become irrelevant
for traders, and in such case we use “#” to replace 1 or 0, indicating that the
corresponding market information is not considered. Thus values of a classified rule
in a trading strategy can be either 1, 0 or #, respectively indicating that the market
condition is true, not true, or irrelevant. Hence a trading strategy with n “#” can
match 2n market conditions. For example, a conditional part of a trading strategy
“#0100 10001” can match both the market conditions “10100 10001” and “00100
10001”. Therefore, each trader needs less than 1,024 strategies to match all market
conditions. In addition, traders have limited learning ability to process all market
information in every trade. To take this into account and to speed up the learning
process, we assume that each trader only considers 28 = 256 strategies.
The second component of a trading strategy is the action of trading. In general,
a trader needs to choose from many types of orders. Goettler et al. (2005) classify
orders into four types, including market order, aggressive limit order, limit order
at the quote, and limit order away from the quote. Similarly, in Menkhoff et al.
(2010) orders are classified into market orders, aggressive limit orders, and patient
limit orders (limit orders at the quote and limit orders away from the quote). In
this paper, we follow Goettler et al. (2005) and classify orders into four types: a
market order (MO), a limit order at the quote (LOA), an aggressive limit order
(ALO), and an unaggressive limit order (ULO, or limit order away from the quote).
To simplify the analysis, we define an aggressive limit order (ALO) to be the limit
order above the bid or below the ask by one tick, and an unaggressive limit order
(ULO) to be the limit order below the bid or above the ask by one tick.14 Therefore
an ALO narrows the bid-ask spread and improves the liquidity, while a LOA does
not narrow the bid-ask spread but supplies immediate liquidity. Given the two sides
of the book and the four types of orders, there are 8 actions in total, listed in Table
2. We use three binary bits to describe actions. For example “000” means a market
buy (MB) order.
Table 2. The actions or order types of trading strategies
Action (buy) Binary code Description Action(sell) Binary code Description
MB 000 Market buy MS 111 Market sell
ALB 001 Aggressive limit buy ALS 110 Aggressive limit sell
LBB 010 Limit buy at the bid LSA 101 Limit sell at the ask
ULB 010 Unaggressive limit buy ULS 100 Unaggressive limit sell
14Generally, the ALO or ULO can deviate from the quote in several ticks. To simplify the
analysis, we set the deviation as one tick.
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By combining the two components, a trading strategy (xi, yi) for a trader means
to take an action yi under market condition xi. For example, one possible trading
strategy i is defined when xi is given by “1#1#1 00#1#” and yi is given by “000”.15
For an informed trader, since he knows the fundamental value, his buy/sell decision
is determined by comparing the fundamental value to the bid and ask, and he uses
GA to optimize his order aggressiveness. For an uninformed trader, he uses the GA
to optimize both the buy-sell decision and order aggressiveness.
2.3. The GA Learning. We consider individual GA learning, meaning that each
trader constructs his own set of trading strategies using the GA. The evolution pro-
cess of the GA includes selection, crossover and mutation. In the selection process,
a trading strategy is selected by a tournament mechanism based on its strength
ηi = πi − δi, where πi represents the performance and δi measures the specificity of
a trading strategy.16 The performance πi of trading strategy i for a trader when he





z + (1− β)π
i
z′, (1)
where β ∈ [0, 1] and riz is the order profit of strategy i with r
i
z = vz − pz for an
executed buy order, riz = pz−vz for an executed sell order, or r
i
z = 0 for an canceled
or expired order at the last trading time z. This means that the performance πi
of trading strategy i for the trader is a weighted average of his recent order profit
riz and his previous performance π
i
z′ of the strategy. A large β means that the
trader weights more on the recent profit and less on the historical performance of
the strategy.
When a trader enters the market initially, all his trading strategies are randomly
generated with most “#” bits in the market condition part.17 With an initial per-
formance of zero, the strength of a trading strategy for the trader is low. When a
submitted order has been executed, or canceled, or expired, the performance and
15In some special limit order book scenarios, certain types of actions or orders are impossible or
unused. For example, when the buy-side of the limit order book is empty, traders can not submit
a market sell MS. These special scenarios are listed in Table 11 of the Appendix.
16The specificity measures the fitness or cost of a trading strategy. For example, for a trading
strategy with ”1#1#1 00#1#”, the number of specific bits (non-omitted bits) m is equal to 5.
The specificity of a trading strategy is equal to mµ, where µ is the bit cost, a small value such as
0.001. Hence, if two trading strategies have the same performance πi, the trading strategy with
less specificity (with more omitted bits, more adaptability) has a higher strength.
17Because the GA needs to use the historical data of the last τ periods to generate technical
rues, we let the market “warm up” for τ periods before traders use the GA to trade. During the
period, traders randomly submit orders.
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                               Crossover                                           Mutation 
                       Parent 1     Parent 2                                     Parent 1 
                          10011     01100                                         10011 
 
             Child 1: 01111 &  Child 2:  10000              Child: 11011 or 1#011 
Figure 1. The crossover and mutation processes of a genetic algorithm.
hence the strength of the strategy are updated by the trader.18 The trader ranks
the performance of all his trading strategies based on the strengths and selects the
top 10% of his strategies to generate new strategies and replaces the bottom 10% of
his strategies. The new strategies are generated through the processes of crossover
and mutation according to given probabilities. Crossover means that, with a cer-
tain probability called the crossover rate, the trader randomly chooses two trading
strategies from the top 10% of the strategies as parents, splits each trading strategy
into two parts at a random bit and then swaps the two parts to create two new
trading strategies as children. This process is illustrated in Figure 1. For example,
the two parents trading strategies are “10011” and “01100”.19 If they are split at
the third bit, then the two new child strategies are “01111” and “10000”. Mutation
means that, with a certain probability called the mutation rate, the trader randomly
selects a high strength trading strategy as a parent and makes a random bit change
of the parent trading strategy to a different value. As illustrated in Figure 1, for
the parent trading strategy“10011”, the second bit is chosen to mutate, then the
child strategy becomes either “11011” or “1#011”. When the market condition
parts cross (mutate), the action parts also cross (mutate) with the same crossover
(mutation) probability. The strength of the child trading strategy is equal to the
average strength of the parents under crossover and the strength of the parent under
mutation (minus its specificity δi).
2.4. A benchmark model. To examine different learning effect of informed and
uninformed traders, we consider a benchmark model (BM) in which both informed
18For the informed trader, the performances of his strategies are updated immediately when he
enters the market. For the uninformed traders, due to the information lag, the performances of
his trading strategies are updated only when the transactions occur before or at period t− τ .
19In our GA with the classifier system, the condition part is a 10-bits string and the act part is
a 3-bits string. To illustrate, we use 5-bits strings as an example.
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and uninformed traders use the GA to learn and compare to the models in which
only informed or uninformed traders learn. For convenience of the discussion, we
refer the benchmark model to a two-side learning model and the other models to
one-side learning models.
For the BM model, we choose an initial fundamental value of v0 = 20, initial
market price p0 = v0 = 20, the tick size 0.01, and the total number of traders in the
market to be 1,000. Based on some empirical studies on the probability of informed
trading (PIN),20 we set the proportion of the informed traders to be 10% in the BM,
which corresponds to 100 informed traders and 900 uninformed traders. On the
volatility of the fundamental value, we choose the Poisson rate φ = 1 and κ = 4.21
This implies that, on average, the innovation of the fundamental value occurs once
every minute and each innovation changes the fundamental value by four ticks.22
For the information lag, we set τ = 360. Considering that one period corresponds
to one minute, τ = 360 implies that the time-lag of the fundamental values is 6
hours, which is one trading day in the Australian Stock Market. We choose the
maximum order survival time as one trading day D = 360. Traders (both informed
and uninformed) arrive the market following a Poisson process with an arrival rate
of λ = 1/60, meaning that each trader enters the market once per hour or 6 times
per day on average.23 We set the discount rate of historical performance β = 0.2, the
crossover rate to be 0.1 and the mutation rate to be 0.3. In Section 5, we conduct a
robustness analysis by considering shorter information lag of τ = 180 and a smaller
β = 0.05. To achieve statistical significance we run 30 simulations. The evolution
process of a GA is active on average of 360 periods, one trading day, which is called
one generation.24 To make the learning more efficient, each simulation runs 180,000
periods, so the evolution process is active for 500 times or generations.
20The PIN models in the literature, such as Yan and Zhang (2012) find that the PIN is between
10% to 20% on average. Since informed traders may have more transactions than uninformed
traders, the proportion of informed traders may be less than the PIN level. Therefore we set the
proportion of the informed traders to be 10% in the BM case. We also consider the fraction of
informed traders to 5% and 90% in a robustness test later.
21Based on the empirical studies in the Australian Stock Market, the standard deviation of
1-minute mid-price returns is about 17 basic points of all stocks of ASX (Comerton-Forde and
Putnin. š (2013)) and about 13 basic points of ASX200 (Putnin. š and Michayluk (2013)). Given the
price level of 20, the average change of price in tick size is about 3.4 tick for all the ASX stocks
and 2.6 ticks for the ASX200 stocks. We also conduct a robustness test for a lower volatility of
κ = 2 later.
22Following this innovation process, the fundamental value may be negative with a very small
probability. So we set the minimum fundamental value to 5 to avoid a negative state.
23Due to limited attention, traders do not continuously monitor the market (Dugast (2012)).
24We also conduct a robustness test for a slower evolution speed of 720 and 1,800 periods.
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To examine the impact of learning on the limit order market, including market
efficiency and traders’ order submission behavior, we need to understand whether
the GA learning becomes stationary and, if so, what kind of information traders use
when making decision. In particular, we are interested in how market information is
used differently by informed and uninformed traders. To measure the stationarity of
the learning, we introduce in the next section the average usage, or using frequency,
of market information defined by the ten classified rules and examine the evolution
of trading strategies.
3. The evolution of trading strategies
In this section, we consider the evolution of trading strategies and examine how
the GA learning helps traders to process market information for the benchmark
model (BM). To examine what kind of market information traders use to trade, we
introduce usage frequency γi ∈ [0, 1] of the classified rule (CR) group i defined in the
Section 2.2. The five CR groups are “Fundamental Value” (FV), “Technical Rules”
(TR), “Quotes and Spread” (QS), “Depth Imbalance” (DI) and “Transaction Sign”
(TS), respectively. When a trader selects a trading strategy to trade, we look at
the condition part of the strategy and count the bits in the corresponding classified
rule which are not “#”.25 For example, if the condition part of a trading strategy
is represented by “##1#1 00#1#”, the classified rules CR1, CR2, CR4, CR8 and
CR10 with “#” are not used and therefore not counted; while CR3, CR5, CR6, CR7
and CR9 are counted for one time. In this way, we calculate the total counts for each
classified rule for informed and uninformed traders respectively. The average usage
frequency γi of the classified rule group i for the informed (uninformed) traders is
calculated by the ratio of the averaged total counts of the classified rules in group
i to the total trading times of informed (uninformed) traders in one generation.
The total trading times of informed (uninformed) traders is equal to the number
of periods for one generation (360 periods), multiplies by the arrival rate λ = 1
60
,
and then multiplies by the number of informed (uninformed) traders NI = 100
(NU = 900). The average usage frequency thus characterizes the usage of different
types of information under the classified rules. Put differently, it represents the
average probability of the usage of every classified rule per trade. For example, for
CR1 to CR4, if the total counts of informed traders in one generation are 210, 220,
180 and 240, respectively, then the average usage frequency of the classified rule
25It would be interesting but challenging to examine both parts of the trading strategy and find
out explicitly what market conditions trigger different types of orders; we leave this to the future
research.
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groups FV and TR for the informed traders is defined by, respectively,









(γCR2 + γCR3 + γCR4) =
1
3





This implies that on average the informed traders use the fundamental value infor-
mation (FV) with a probability of 0.35 and the information based on the technical
rules (TR) with a probability of 0.356 per trade. Examining the evolution of the
usage frequency over generations helps to understand how different group of market
information is used under the GA and wether the learning process of the trading
strategy becomes stationary.




















































(a) Informed traders (b) Uninformed traders
Figure 2. The average usage frequency per trade γi of each classi-
fied rule group i for informed traders (a) and uninformed traders (b)
in 500 generations (trading days). Different colours represent different
CR groups.
If the GA learning is effective, more market information will be incorporated
into the trading strategies and hence the average usage of the classified rules is
expected to increase over the initial generations. In Fig. 2 we report the average
usage frequencies of each classified rule group over 500 generations for informed (a)
and uninformed (b) traders. The results lead to two observations. First, all the γi
for both informed and uninformed traders increase quickly in the early generations
and then are stabilized with small fluctuates around some mean levels. Also the
speed of the convergence is faster for informed than uninformed traders, taking
about 50 generations for informed traders (in Fig. 2 (a)) and 200 generations for
uninformed traders (in Fig. 2 (b)). Secondly, the average usage frequency for
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uninformed traders is higher than for informed traders. Fig. 2 shows that the
average usage across different CR groups settles down to about 0.35 for informed
traders and 0.45 for uninformed traders. This means that on average each group of
information is used with probability of 0.35 for the informed traders and 0.45 for
the uninformed traders in each trading strategy. Intuitively, compare to uninformed
traders, informed traders do not need to use the GA learning to make the buy-sell
decision and therefore their average usage of market information is lower.
Based on the first observation, the average usage frequencies across all CR groups
seem to become stationary in long run. To verify this, we first estimate the distri-
bution of γi over the last 200 generations (from the generation 301 to the generation
500) across all CR groups. It is found that the distribution of γi across different
CR group i approximates to a normal distribution. We then split the series of γi
into two parts with 100 generations in each part and find that the first half has the
same mean as the second half based on ANOVA (Analysis of Variance). Therefore
we conclude that, measured by the average usage frequency, the learning process
becomes stationary in long run. It is the stationarity property of the learning that
enables us to examine the impact of the learning on the market and traders’ order
submission, to be explored in the following section.







































(a) Informed traders (b) Uninformed traders
Figure 3. The patterns of the means of the whole series, the first
half and the second half of γi among different classified rule groups of
informed traders (a) and uninformed traders (b).
We further examine whether the patterns of γi among different CR groups are
the same. We report the patterns in Fig. 3 for for informed traders in (a) and un-
informed traders in (b). Apart from showing that the average usage of information
is higher for uninformed than for informed traders, the average usage frequency un-
der the classified rules varies from 0.343 to 0.375 for informed traders and 0.440 to
0.462 for uninformed traders (indicated by the mean values in Table 12 in Appendix
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B). Furthermore, among different groups of information, the average usage of the
CR group TS related to the last transaction sign is the highest for the informed
traders, while for the uninformed traders, the highest is the CR group TR related
to comparison of the moving average prices to the expected fundamental value and
the mid-price.26 This result clearly indicates that, because of information asymme-
try, the informed traders use more information on the last transaction while the
uninformed traders use more information on technical rules, in particular moving
averages27 when they submit their orders. In the next section, we further explore
the impact of such difference between informed and uninformed traders on order
profit, market information efficiency and order submission. It is interesting to note
that market information of moving averages is useful for not only the uninformed
traders, but also the informed traders.
The results above demonstrate that the GA learning becomes stationary in long-
run. In a double auction market, Arthur et al. (1997) find that the GA with a
classifier system makes the market price converge to rationally expected prices. To
our knowledge, this is the first paper showing the stationarity of the GA learning
with a classifier system in a limit order market. In a limit order market model, Goet-
tler et al. (2009) employ a Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is stationary
and symmetric and each type of traders can choose the same strategy. Traders’
strategies do not depend on market conditions when they enter the market. This is
different from our model in which traders’ strategies depend on market conditions
and information asymmetry. The stationarity of the GA learning can be used to
characterize stationary trading strategies in limit order markets. More importantly,
this allows us to provide insight into how informed and uninformed traders use the
order book information to endogenously determine their order choice, which is a key
issue in limit order markets highlighted in a survey of Rosu (2012).
4. The learning effect
With the stationary GA learning shown in the previous section, we are able to
examine the effect of the learning on the order profit, information efficiency, the
bid-ask spread and order submission. We also examine the effect by comparing the
two-side learning of the BM model to the one-side learning models in which only
the uninformed or informed traders learn, respectively. To explore the role of the
information process, we then focus on the effect of the most used classified rules
26We also use ANOVA and show that this finding is significant, illustrated by Fig. 8 in Appendix
C.
27Since Group TR includes three CRs, we use ANOVA to analyze all the CRs and report the
result in Fig. 9 of Appendix C. It shows that the average usage of CR4, the moving average rules
of market price, is the highest.
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obtained in the previous section. Since the GA learning becomes stationary after
300 trading days, we take the last 200 trading days (the last 36,000 periods) for the
analysis, and we set the total number of the analysis periods T = 36, 000.
We first introduce measures for order profit and information efficiency and nota-
tions on order submission. The order profit per trade rt is calculated by the difference
between the transaction price pt of the executed order and the fundamental value
vt and rt = vt − pt for an executed buy order and rt = pt − vt for an executed sell
order. We denote rI and rU as the average order profit per trade of the informed
and uninformed traders, respectively. Note that our model is a zero-sum game. Be-
cause of the information advantage, the order profit is positive for informed traders
and negative for uninformed traders. For market information efficiency, we follow
Theissen (2000) and use Mean Relative Error (MRE) to measure the relative error









For order submission, we classify orders of type j traders (j = I for the informed
traders and j = U for the uninformed traders) into four classes: market buy/sell
orders MBj/MSj , unaggressive limit buy/sell orders ULBj/ULSj , limit buy/sell
orders at quote LBAj/LSAj , and aggressive limit buy/sell orders ALBj/ALSj. We
denote
MOj = MBj +MSj , ULOj = ULBj + ULSj ,
LOAj = LBAj + LSAj , ALOj = ALBj + ALSj
the aggregate orders of the four classes of orders.
For the two-side learning of the BM model and one-side uninformed learning (UL)
and informed learning (IL) models, we report the order profit, information efficiency
and the bid-ask spread in Table 3. We also report the average number of different
orders per trader over 600 trades in Table 4, together with the executed limit orders
ELOI/ELOU for the informed in the upper panel and uninformed traders in the
lower panel.
4.1. The effect of learning on order profit, information efficiency, the bid-
ask spread and order submission. For the BM two-side learning model, the
results in Table 3 show an average order profit of 35.19 ticks for the informed trader
and -3.51 ticks for the uninformed trader per trade. The information efficiencyMRE
is 2.21% and the bid-ask spread is 6.24 ticks. On order submission, the results for
the BM model in Table 4 show that both informed and uninformed traders place
more limit orders (all together) than market orders. Also, the informed traders
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Table 3. The learning effect on order profit rI and rU in ticks, infor-
mation efficiency MRE and the bid-ask spread s in ticks. The value
in bracket is the standard deviation of the 30 simulations, and * indi-
cates the significant difference between the BM model and the other
model (under ANOVA with p− value for the relevant F − statistic is
less than 1%, (the following tables are the same), similarly hereinafter
in later tables.
Case rI rU MRE s
BM 35.19 -3.51 2.21% 6.24
[4.61] [0.45] [1.37%] [2.91]
UL 31.74* -3.23* 1.49%* 7.28*
[4.69] [0.46] [0.69%] [3.58]
IL 59.84* -8.37* 4.06%* 16.00*
[4.49] [0.59] [1.90%] [7.71]
Table 4. The learning effect on order submission.
Case MOI ALOI LOAI ULOI ELOI
BM 155 100 172 173 149
[1] [2] [2] [2] [2]
UL 168* 97* 168* 168* 143*
[1] [3] [1] [2] [1]
IL 147* 133* 161* 159* 227*
[1] [3] [2] [1] [2]
Case MOU ALOU LOAU ULOU ELOU
BM 169 96 167 168 170
[1] [3] [1] [1] [1]
UL 168* 97* 167 168 171
[1] [2] [1] [1] [1]
IL 153* 133* 157* 157* 144*
[1] [3] [2] [1] [1]
submit less market orders and more limit orders (of all types) than the uninformed
traders, which is consistent with Goettler et al. (2009).
To examine the effect of learning, we compare the results of two-side learning
model to the one-side learning models. We first study the effect of learning from
the informed traders by comparing the results for the UL model (in which only
the uninformed traders learn) to the BM model (in which both informed and un-
informed learn). Table 3 shows that, when the informed traders learn, the order
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profit increases by about 10% (from 31.74 to 35.19 ticks) for the informed traders
and decreases by about 10% (from -3.23 to -3.51 ticks) for the uninformed traders.
If we decompose the total order profit of the informed traders in the BM into the
profits generated by their private information and learning respectively, the results
show that about 90% (=31.74/35.19) of their profit is from their private information
and 10% (=(35.19-31.74)/35.19) is from the learning. This implies that, informed
traders’ profit is mainly from their information advantage, but the learning also
helps to increase their order profit. Interestingly, theMRE increases by 0.72% (from
1.49% to 2.21%) while the bid-ask spread is reduced by about one(≈ 7.28 − 6.24)
tick. This implies that the learning from the informed traders reduces market in-
formation efficiency but increases market liquidity. To provide an explanation, we
examine the order submission behavior of traders. Table 4 shows that, when the
informed traders learn, their market orders MOI decrease by about 8% (from 168
to 155) but the limit orders increase by about 3%, in particular, the executed limit
orders increase by more than 4%. However, there is no significant change in order
submission for the uninformed traders. This indicates that the reduction in the mar-
ket information efficiency may be due to the manipulation of the informed traders
by setting the prices through submitting more limit orders and less market orders,
while the reduction in the bid-ask spread is due to the increase in liquidity supply
and the decrease in liquidity consumption.
Next we examine the effect of learning from the uninformed traders by comparing
the results of the IL model (in which only the informed traders learn) to the BM
model. Table 3 shows that, when the uninformed traders learn, the order profit for
the informed traders decreases by about 41% (from 59.84 to 35.19 ticks) and the
loss for the uninformed traders reduces by about 58% (from -8.37 to -3.51 ticks).
Also, the learning from the uninformed traders significantly reduces MRE by 1.85%
(from 4.06% to 2.21%) and the spread by about 10 (≈ 16 − 6.24) ticks. For order
submission, Table 4 shows that both the informed and uninformed traders increase
their market orders and limit orders at or away from the quote (by about 5% to
15%) but reduce their aggressive limit orders significantly (by about 25% for the
informed traders and 28% for the uninformed traders). Note that the executed limit
orders reduce by about 34% for the informed traders but increase by about 19%
for the uninformed traders. As the result, both information efficiency and market
liquidity are improved.
In summary, comparing to the learning from the informed traders, the learning
from the uninformed traders has more significant impact on the order profit. It
reduces the profit per trade of the informed traders (by about 41%) and the loss per
trade of the uninformed traders (by about 58%). It makes the traders submit more
market orders and limit orders at or away from the quote but less aggressive limit
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orders. It improves market information efficiency and liquidity. Some literature
on GA learning, such as Kluger and McBride (2011) and Anufriev et al. (2013)
shows that learning is effective and helpful for market efficiency. Our results show
that the learning of uninformed traders improves the market information efficiency;
however, informed traders may learn to manipulate the market which in turn reduce
market information efficiency. This result is interesting and new to literature. More
importantly, apart from a few studies,28 this is the first paper that provides some
insight into how learning can affect order submission differently for informed and
uninformed traders.
4.2. The effect of the classified information. We have shown in the previous
section that, when traders make their decisions by the GA learning, the usefulness of
different types of information characterized by the classified rules can be different for
informed and uninformed traders. The average usage of all types of information is
high (about 45%) for the uninformed traders and low (about 35%) for the informed
traders. We further show that the information of the last transaction sign under
the classified rule group TS is the most used, about 37.5% for the informed traders,
while for the uninformed traders, it is the technical rule group TR, about 46.2%. It
is important, but also challenging, to understand how different types of information
affect traders’ order submission and market efficiency. To tackle this challenge, we
focus on the most used information (instead of all types of information) to illustrate
the information effect. We consider two cases, one is denoted as NTS in which the
classified rule group TS is removed for the informed traders only, and the other is
denoted as NTR in which the classified rule group TR is removed for the uninformed
traders only.29 By comparing NTS to the BM case, we examine the effect of the
information of the last transaction sign for the informed traders. Similarly, by
comparing NTR to the BM case, we examine the effect of the technical rules for the
uninformed traders. The results on the effect of order profit and market efficiency
are reported in Table 5.
28In an empirical study, Nicolosi et al. (2009) find that individual traders do learn from their
trading experience to get better forecasting of signal precision, and consequently adjust their port-
folio management behavior and thus efficiently improve their profit and order submission. In
another empirical study, Grinblatt, Keloharju and Linnainma (2012) find that high IQ traders
submit more market orders when the bid-ask spreads temporarily narrow and have better execu-
tions than low IQ traders. They conjecture that high IQ traders are more capable of exploiting
and processing limit order market information.
29Note that the classified rule group TS stays for the uninformed traders in the NTS case and
the classified rule group TR stays for the informed traders in the NTR case; the other parameters
of the two cases remain the same as in the BM case.
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Table 5. The effects of the Group TS of informed trades and the
Group TR of uninformed traders.
Case rI rU MRE s
BM 35.19 -3.51 2.21% 6.24
[4.61] [0.45] [1.37%] [2.91]
NTS 34.45* -3.41* 1.83%* 7.54*
[4.06] [0.42] [1.37%] [4.06]
NTR 38.16* -3.82* 3.52%* 4.89*
[4.39] [0.43] [1.70%] [3.83]
We first compare NTS to BM. Table 5 shows that, by considering the information
on the last transaction signs (group TS), the average order profit increases by about
2% (from 34.45 to 35.19 ticks) for the informed traders but decreases by about 2%
(from -3.41 to -3.51 ticks) for the uninformed traders. Also, the market efficiency is
reduced, but the spread becomes narrow. This result is consistent with the learning
effect of the informed traders we discussed in the previous subsection. For the order
submission, the results in Table 13 of Appendix D show that the informed traders
submit more market orders (by about 2.5%) and slightly less limit orders, while there
is no significant change for the uninformed traders. Therefore, with the information
of the last transaction signs, the informed traders improve their order profit and
consume liquidity. The decrease in the information efficiency also reflects that the
last transaction sign may help informed traders to manipulate the order book. The
bid-ask spread also reduces because the informed traders learn better with the last
transaction sign.
Next we compare NTR to BM. Table 5 shows that, by using the technical rules
(group TR), the average order loss for the uninformed traders is reduced by about
8% (from -3.82 to -3.51 ticks), while the profit for the informed traders is also
reduced by about 8% (from 38.16 to 35.19 ticks). The market efficiency is improved
but the spread becomes wider. For the order submission, the results in Table 13
of Appendix D show that there is no significant change in order submission except
the uninformed traders submit slightly more aggressive limit orders and less patient
orders, which is consistent with Menkhoff et al. (2010) who show that uninformed
traders treat aggressive limit order as a substitute for patient limit order. Note
that the number of the executed limit orders is higher for the uninformed traders
than for the informed traders. Therefore, using the technical rules, the uninformed
traders can improve their order profit significantly. It seems that using of technical
rules may increase the spread, but helps the uninformed traders to submitting more
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corrected orders, in particular the aggressive limit orders. This result is consistent
with the broad use and success of momentum like strategies in finance.30
In summary, we show that learning and information are valuable for all traders,
though the role of learning based on different types of information can be different for
informed and uninformed traders. Because of the information disadvantage, learning
becomes more valuable for uninformed traders. The analysis in this section provides
an insight into how learning and different types of information affect the order profit,
order submission, market liquidity and information efficiency differently.
5. Robustness analysis and implications
The previous section focuses on the learning and classified information effect and
the results are mainly based on the BM model. In this section, we conduct a
robustness analysis to examine the effect of (i) private value, (ii) evolution speed,
and (iii) the market fraction of the informed traders.31 We also report the results
on the robustness analysis of (iv) the fundamental volatility, (v) the information
lag, and (vi) the discount rate of the historical performance in the GA learning in
Appendix E.
5.1. Private value. In the BM model, we ignore the trading motivation of the
uninformed traders who always lose money to the informed traders,32 which is sup-
ported by empirical studies (see Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean (2009) and Chung et al.
(2013)). To motivate uninformed traders to trade, Goettler et al. (2009) introduce
private value for uninformative traders whose order submissions mainly depend on
the private values. For example, an uninformed trader with a large positive pri-
vate value prefers to submit a market buy order. We are interested in the effect of
introducing private values, in particular for the uninformed traders, on the results
obtained in the last section.
We consider the uninformed traders who obtain private values (or liquidity com-
pensations) when their orders are executed.33 The private value is considered in the
trading performance of the GA according to (1), while the classifier system of their
GA learning is kept the same. We consider two cases: a low private value PV 6 and
30We would like to thank a referee for pointing this connection to momentum trading.
31We would like to thank the referees for the suggestion of including the robustness analysis of
private value and evolution speed.
32Based on the framework of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Routledge (1999) allows uninformed
traders to make profit; however, the economy considered is quite different from the economy of a
dynamic limit order market with continuous double auction.
33To keep the model symmetric, independent of buying or selling, the uninformed trader obtains
the same private value from his trading.
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a high private value PV 30. In the case of PV6, the uninformed trader has a pri-
vate value pvi which is uniformly distributed in [4, 8] ticks, which is consistent with
Goettler et al. (2009). In the case of PV30 with large private value, pvi is uniformly
distributed over [20, 40] ticks.34 We keep the private value the same for the trader
in each transaction. For example, for an uninformed trader i with a private value
of 6 ticks, if the trader submits a market buy order and obtains pt − vt = −4, then
the order profit of the trader is 6 − 4 = 2 ticks. We find that, compare to the BM,
the results are robust when the private value is low (for the case of PV6). However,
high private value can have significantly different impact initially, but the impact
disappears in long-run. To explore the difference, we report the results based on
the first 7,200 periods (10 trading days), denoted by BME and PV30E, and the last
7,200 period after 300 trading days, denoted by BML and PV30L respectively for
the BM and PV30 cases. We report the price dynamics of the first 7,200 periods
and the last 7,200 periods in Fig. 4. We also report the patterns of information
usage of the classifier rules in Fig. 5, the order profit, information efficiency, bid-ask
spread in Table 6, and the order submission in Table 7.
Table 6. Private value effect on order profit, information efficiency
and the bid-ask.
Case pv rI rU MRE s
BME 0 41.14 -6.2 2.51% 5.41
PV30E [20,40] 43.13* 24.84* 2.60%* 3.66*
BM 0 35.19 -3.51 2.21% 6.24
PV6 [4,8] 35.07 2.48* 2.60%* 5.13*
PV30 [20,40] 35.87* 26.38* 2.44%* 5.41*
Figure 4 shows that, compare to the BM case, the private value for the unin-
formed traders can have a significant impact on the market price initially. This is
indicated by large deviations of the market price from the fundamental value for
PV30E case most of the time. The corresponding results on order submission in
Table 7 show that with private value, the uninformed traders submit more market
orders and aggressive limit orders compared to the BM case (comparing BME and
PV30E, MOU increases from 109 to 141, and ALOU increases from 60 to 87), and
the information efficiency indicated in Table 6 becomes worse than the BM case
(MRE increases from 2.51% to 2.60%), but the spread is reduced (from 5.41 to
34Please note that in the cases of PV6 and PV30, the private value corresponds to a no-zero-sum
game.
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Figure 4. The market price and fundamental value for the BM case
(a) and PV30 case (b) over the first 7,200 periods and the BM case
(c) and the PV30 case (d) over the last 7,200 periods.
3.66). Intuitively, since the uninformed traders are compensated from their trad-
ing, they trade more aggressively by submitting more market orders, which increase
the price volatility and reduce the information efficiency. They also submit more
aggressive limit orders, which reduce the spread. However, in long run, the impact
of the private values becomes insignificant, compare to the BM case. Fig. 4 shows
that the price dynamics of the PV30 case in (d) is similar to the BM case in (c).
Fig. 5 shows that the average usages of the five groups of market information under
the GA learning for the uninformed traders with low and high private values (in
PV6 and PV30 cases) share similar patterns to the BM case in Fig. 3 (b). Table
6 reports that the uninformed traders make positive order profit35 from their trad-
ing in the PV6 and PV30 cases, however, the order profit for the informed traders,
together with the market information efficiency and the bid-ask spread, does not
change much. In addition, Table 7 reports that the order submissions do not change
35Taking the mean private values into account, the order profit for the PV6 and PV30 is about
the same as the BM case for the uninformed traders
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(a) PV6 case (b) PV30 case
Figure 5. The patterns of the means of the whole series, the first
half and the second half of γi among different classified rule groups of
uninformed traders in PV6 case (a) and PV30 case(b).
Table 7. The private value effect on order submission.
Case MOI ALOI LOAI ULOI ELOI
BME 258 29 201 113 70
PV30E 232* 44* 203 120* 95*
BM 155 100 172 173 149
PV6 155 100 172 174 150
PV30 155 100 172 174 150
Case MOU ALOU LOAU ULOU ELOU
BME 109 60 225 206 130
PV30E 141* 87* 198* 174* 157*
BM 169 96 167 168 170
PV6 169 94 168 169 170
PV30 169 94 168 169 169
significantly. Therefore the private value of the uninformed traders may have sig-
nificant impact on the limit order market and order submission in short run, but
the impact becomes insignificant in long run. This is very different from Goettler
et al. (2009) in which the order submission of uninformed traders depends on their
private values. With the GA learning, the order submission and order profit (after
taking their compensation into account) of the uninformed traders do not depend
on their private values.
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5.2. The evolution speed of the GA. It is important to understand how the
speed of the evolution of the GA learning affects the results. In some GA learning
models, such as SFI-ASM, the evolution speed has impact on the convergence of GA
and market dynamics. In the BM case, the evolution of GA takes asynchronously
on average of 360 periods (one trading day). To examine this effect, we consider
two cases to examine the effect of slow down in the evolution of GA.36 In the first
case, we reduce the evolution speed to 720 periods (two trading days) on average,
denoted by SD2, which is two times slower than the BM case; in the second case,
we reduce the evolution speed to 1,800 periods (5 trading days) on average, denoted
by SD5, which is 5 times slower than the BM case. For the SD2 case, Fig. 6 (a)
and (b) show that the evolution dynamics of γi do not change significantly. The
changes in order profit, information efficiency and the bid-ask spread are also small,
showing in Table 8. Intuitively, when the evolution speed of the GA reduces (but not
too much), trading strategies have more opportunity to be selected and tested and
therefore better performed strategies are more likely to be selected for the evolution
in the next generation. However, if the evolution speed slows down substantially,
such as in the SD5 case, the GA may not be able to converge (even after 500 trading
days), illustrated in Fig. 6(c) and (d), and the market dynamics and the order
submission reported in Tables 8 and 9 change significantly. Therefore there is a
trade-off effect between the speed of the evolution and the effectiveness of the GA
learning.
Table 8. Slow evolution effect on order profit, information efficiency
and the bid-ask spread.
Case rI rU MRE s
BM 35.19 -3.51 2.21% 6.24
SD2 36.80* -3.67* 2.34%* 5.84*
SD5 19.07* -4.33* 0.79% 5.36*
5.3. The fraction of informed traders and the implication for PIN. Clearly
the market fraction of the informed traders, the fundamental volatility, the informa-
tion lag and the weight on the last performance can affect the results. We conduct
a robustness analysis of these factors and report the results in Appendix E. The
results show in all the cases, the GA learning process becomes stationary in the
long run, the patterns of usage frequency among classified rule groups are similar,
and the effects on the order profit, information efficiency and the order submission
are consistent with our intuition (for example, the information efficiency, the spread
36This robustness test is suggested by an anonymous referee.
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(a) Informed traders in SD2 (b) Uninformed traders in SD2














































(a) Informed traders in SD5 (b) Uninformed traders in SD5
Figure 6. The evolution dynamics of γi in the SD2 case and the SD5 case.
Table 9. Slow evolution effect on order submission.
Case MOI ALOI LOAI ULOI ELOI
BM 155 100 172 173 149
SD2 155 100 171 173 149
SD3 485* 36* 59* 19* 28*
Case MOU ALOU LOAU ULOU ELOU
BM 169 96 167 168 170
SD2 169 95 168 169 170
SD5 75* 70* 305* 150* 126*
and the order profit of the informed traders improve as the fraction of the informed
traders decreases).
The robustness analysis on the fraction of the informed traders has an implication
to the probability of informed trading (PIN), which is a very important measure in
limit order markets. Both the spread and volatility are very important indicators for
the PIN estimation. In our model, we can calculate the PIN directly since we know
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the executed orders of informed traders exactly. As the fraction of the informed
traders increases from 5% to 90%, we report the PIN, volatility of market-price
return (in basis points), bid-ask spread (in ticks), and trading volume in Table 10.
The results show that the calculated PIN is matching closely to the fraction of the
informed traders. Also, when the fraction of the informed traders increases, both the
spread and volatility increase, while the trading volume decreases, and the relation
are monotonic but nonlinear.37 The positive relation between the PIN and the
spread is consistent with some empirical studies in the environment of short-lived
information (see Ahn, Cai, Hamao and Ho (2002) and Ruchti (2012)), but different
from Rosu (2014) who infers that the fraction of informed traders and the PIN are
negatively correlated to the bid-ask spread when the information is long-lived. Rosu
(2014) also suggests to use the ratio of the market-price volatility to the bid-ask
spread to measure the informed shares, which can be represented by the PIN. We
also report the ratio of the volatility to the bid-ask spread in Table 10. Different from
Rosu (2014), the result shows that the PIN is positively correlated with the bid-ask
spread and the volatility, but negatively correlated with the ratio of the volatility
to the bid-ask spread. Therefore it is very important to consider the environment
of short/long-lived information when using various measures to estimate the PIN.38
Since the volatility of market-price return and the bid-ask spread are observable
from the intra-day data, this result provides a useful implication for the estimation
of the PIN, in particular for intra-day PIN models in limit order markets.39
To conclude the discussion, we provide some intuitions on the above findings. As
the number of the informed traders increases, on the one hand, any mispriced limited
order from the uninformed traders is more likely executed by market orders from
the informed traders, which enlarges the spread and increases the volatility. On the
other hand, the pick-off risk increases for the informed traders due to the competition
among themselves; hence they prefer to use market orders or less aggressive limit
orders instead of aggressive limit orders when trading is profitable. This leads to an
37We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion of examining the monotonicity.
38Rosu (2014) also pointed out that:“It is possible that both views are correct, but in different
circumstances. For instance, one can expect the adverse selection view to hold in the case of
scheduled corporate announcements, when information is relatively short-lived. At the same time,
the dynamic efficiency view may hold in a more stationary environment, with non-scheduled news
and long-lived information. Each view is supported by empirical work.”
39The extant PIN models are based on three types of model including Easley, Keifer, OHara and
Paperman (1996) who estimate the PIN of daily frequency based on aggregate buy-sell initiated
trades in market maker markets; Nyholm (2003) who estimates the PIN with high frequency based
on the bid-ask spread set by market makers; and Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2003) who estimate
the PIN based on the bid-ask spread in limit order markets (by assuming that informed traders
only submit market orders).
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increase in the spread and volatility. In addition, when more informed traders arrive
the market during a trading period, their orders are more likely on the same side of
the book, which reduce the trading volume and increase the spread. However, when
the bid-ask spread is too large, the learning makes traders submit more aggressive
limit orders (see the ALO in Table 15). This effect narrows the bid-ask spread.
Therefore the monotonic relations between the bid-ask spread, volatility, volume
and the fraction of the informed traders are nonlinear.
Table 10. The volatility of market-price return in basis points, the
bid-ask spread in ticks and the probability of informed trading.
Fraction PIN Volatility Spread Volatility/Spread volume
5% 4.70%* 28.70* 4.38* 6.55* 4.7
10% 9.06% 39.28 6.24 6.29 4.7
20% 17.53%* 49.19* 8.53* 5.77* 4.6*
50% 43.56%* 56.88* 10.83* 5.25* 4.4*
90% 86.98%* 69.31* 13.41* 5.17* 4.1*
6. Conclusion
What traders can learn from the market and how they process market information
are very important and challenging questions in limit order markets. This paper
proposes a dynamic limit order model in which the trading strategies of the informed
and uninformed traders evolve endogenously. By introducing a genetic algorithm
learning with a classifier system, we combine information processing and order choice
into the trading strategy and allow traders to endogenously determine their order
submission according to market conditions. This helps to overcome the challenge
and reveal the black box of information processing and to examine the learning effect
on market efficiency and order submission .
We show that when the evolution of trading strategies becomes stationary in long
run, the average information usage is higher for uninformed traders than informed
traders. Also informed traders pay more attention to the last transaction sign while
uninformed traders pay more attention to technical rules (in particular the mov-
ing average rule of historical prices) than other market information. Learning of
uninformed traders reduces their loss, improves market information efficiency and
reduces the bid-ask spread while learning of informed traders improves their order
profit, reduces bid-ask spread but the market information efficiency may be reduced.
In general, learning is more effective and hence more valuable to uninformed traders
than informed traders. Learning makes uninformed traders submit more market
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orders than aggressive limit orders while learning makes informed traders reduce
market orders and increase aggressive limit orders.
We also conduct a robustness analysis and provide some implications. Surprisedly,
we find that though private value can influence the order submission of uninformed
traders at early periods, however, in the long run, its impact is ultimately eliminated
by the GA learning so it does not have impact on the learning efficiency and order
submission. Interestingly, we find that the evolution speed does not have significant
impact on the learning and order submission when it does not slow down too much.
More importantly, we find that the probability of informed trading (PIN) is pos-
itively correlated with volatility and the bid-ask spread but negatively correlated
with the ratio of volatility to the bid-ask spread. This is a useful implication for
estimating the PIN in limit order markets.
Our model can be expanded in at least two aspects in the future research. One
aspect is that improving the classifier system and let traders learn from more order
book information. The other aspect is that using GA learning to capture the features
of high frequency trading in limit order markets.
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Appendix
A. Some special limit order book scenarios. Obviously, in some special limit
order book scenarios, some actions are impossible or unused. For example, when the
bid-ask spread is minimum (equal to one tick), a trader can not submit aggressive
limit orders; and when the buy (sell) side limit order book is empty, a trader can not
submit market sell (buy), and if he/she submits a limit buy (sell), the submitted
limit order becomes the limit order at quote at the buy (sell) side. We list the
scenarios and corresponding actions in Table 11.
Table 11. The restrictions of actions.
Scenario Unused action
The book is not empty The bid-ask spread is more than one tick None
The bid-ask spread is equal to one tick ALB and ALS
The book is empty Only when the buy side is empty MS, ALB & ULB
Only when the sell side is empty MB, ALS & ULS
Both the buy and sell sides are empty MB, ALB, ULB, MS, ALS & ULS
B. The stationarity of trading strategies. In this appendix, we provide statis-
tical analysis to examine the stationarity of trading strategies, which is measured by
the average usage frequency of different group of market information. To examine
whether the mean of γi is stationary, we select the γi of the last 200 generations
(from the generation 301 to the generation 500) and split the whole series into two
parts with 100 equal generations. At first step, we estimate the distribution of γi.
Fig. 7 reports the distribution plots for γTS of informed traders in (a) and γTR
of uninformed traders in (b) respectively. Fig. 7 shows that the distribution of γi
approximates a normal distribution. 40
We also use ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) to examine whether the first half has
the same mean as the second half. We report the probability of ANOVA in Table
12 (see the last row). We also report the mean, maximum, minimum and standard
deviation of the whole series. It shows that the probability of ANOVA of each γi for
both informed and uninformed traders is higher than 1% (for most i, γi is higher
than 5%). Therefore the ANOVA can not reject the hypothesis and demonstrates
that the first half and the second half series have the same mean. Also the maximum
and minimum of γi are close and the standard deviation is very small. The result
shows that γi becomes a stationary in long run.
40We also estimate the distributions of the other γi and the results are the same.
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(a) Informed traders (b) Uninformed traders
Figure 7. The estimated distribution plots of (a) γTS of informed
traders and (b) γTR of uninformed traders.
Table 12. The statistics of γi in the last 200 generations (200 trading
days, 72,000 periods). The last column is the probability of ANOVA
for the first half and the second half of the series.
Group Mean MAX MIN STD ANOVA
Informed traders
FV 0.343 0.354 0.330 0.005 97.33%
TR 0.351 0.360 0.339 0.004 22.25%
QS 0.365 0.374 0.356 0.004 51.26%
DI 0.362 0.373 0.353 0.004 21.73%
TS 0.375 0.390 0.363 0.005 73.17%
Uninfromed traders
FV 0.440 0.452 0.429 0.003 90.57%
TR 0.462 0.468 0.456 0.003 9.75%
QS 0.457 0.462 0.452 0.002 4.22%
DI 0.446 0.451 0.440 0.002 11.95%
TS 0.445 0.451 0.440 0.002 45.66%
C. The ANOVA for the patterns of usage frequency among CR groups.
We provide the ANOVA of the patterns of γi among different CR groups for informed
traders in Figure 8(a) and for uninformed traders in Figure 8(b). We also report the
the ANOVA of the patterns of among different Classified rules (from CR1 to CR10)
for uninformed traders in Figure 9.
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(a) Informed traders (b) Uninformed traders
Figure 8. The ANOVA of γi among the CR groups of the last 100

















Figure 9. The ANOVA of average usage frequency among different
CRs of the last 200 generations for uninformed traders. The p value
is 0.
D. The effect of classified information on order submission. We report
the order submission for the Group TS of informed trades and the Group TR of
uninformed traders in Table 13.
E. Other robustness tests. Based on Section 5, we conduct a further robustness
analysis including (i) cases LI and HI for lower and higher number of informed
trades with NI = 50 and NI = 200 respectively (meaning the market fraction of the
informed traders is 5% for LI case, 10% for the BM case, and 20% for HI case); (ii)
case LV for lower fundamental volatility κ = 2 (meaning that the fundamental value
changes two ticks, instead of four ticks for the BM case, per minute on average);
(iii) case SL for short information lag τ = 180 (half day, instead of one day in
the BM case); and (iv) case LB for lower weight β = 0.05 (instead of β = 0.2
for the BM case) on the recent profit in the performance measure of the GA. The
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Table 13. The order submission for the Group TS of informed trades
and the Group TR of uninformed traders.
Case MOI ALOI LOAI ULOI ELOI
BM 155 100 172 173 149
[1] [2] [2] [2] [2]
NTS 151* 101 173 175 149
[2] [3] [2] [2] [2]
NTR 155 100 172 173 151
[2] [3] [2] [2] [2]
Case MOU ALOU LOAU ULOU ELOU
BM 169 96 167 168 170
[1] [3] [1] [1] [1]
NTS 169 96 167 168 169
[1] [3] [1] [1] [1]
NTR 169 93* 169 169 170
[1] [3] [1] [1] [1]
other parameters are the same as the BM case. We first examine the stationarity of
trading strategies and then the effect of learning and information.
The stationarity of trading strategies—For all these cases, we find the same
stationarity of trading strategies as in the BM case. We report the patterns of the
average usage frequencies among different classified rule groups for informed traders
and uninformed traders in Fig. 10 (a) and (b) respectively. We see that Fig. 10
shares the same patterns as in Fig. 3; that is, the information usage is higher for
the uninformed traders than the informed traders, also the most used information
classified rule is the last transaction sign (TS) for the informed traders and the
technical rules (TR) for the uninformed traders. Comparing among different cases,
we find from Fig.10 (a) that, for the informed traders, the average usage of the CR
groups QS, DI and TS are the highest for case LI, while the lowest is group TR
for case SL. This indicates that, when there are less informed traders, the market
becomes less informative and the informed traders pay more attention to the order
book information in order to make profit from trading with uninformed traders.
When the information lag is short, informed traders pay less attention to technical
rules. From Fig.10 (b), we find that for the uninformed traders, the average usage
of all the classified rule groups is the highest for case SL. This means that, when
the information lag is short, market becomes more informative and the uninformed
traders use all the market information more frequently in order to reduce their loss.
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(a) Informed traders (b) Uninformed traders
Figure 10. The patterns of the means of different cases of γi among
different classified rule groups for (a) informed and (b) uninformed
traders.
The effect on order profit and information efficiency—We report the re-
sults of the order profit, market information efficiency, and bid-ask spread for all the
five cases in Table 14. Comparing to the BM model, it shows a significant impact
of the volatility (case LV ) and the number of the informed traders (cases LI and
HI) but insignificant impact of the information lag (case SL) and the performance
measure (case LB). In particular, when the volatility is reduced (from κ = 4 in the
BM case to κ = 2 in case LV ), market becomes more informative, which reduces
the average order profit by about 60% (from 35.19 to 12.83 ticks) for the informed
traders and the loss by about 60% for the uninformed traders. In addition, the
market efficiency improves significantly and the spread becomes smaller. When the
number of the informed traders drops (from 10% in the BM to 5% in case LI),
market becomes less informative. The profit for the informed traders increases by
about 63% (because of their information advantage) and the loss for the uninformed
traders is also reduced by about 6% (due to the learning). Both the market efficiency
and spread are reduced. When the number of informed traders increases (from 10%
in the BM to 20% in case HI), the effect becomes opposite (except that the loss for
the uninformed traders is reduced) but is less significant.
The effect on order submission—We report the results of order submission
of the informed and uninformed traders for all the five cases in Table 15. Similar
to the previous discussion, the fundamental volatility (case LV ) and the number
of informed traders (cases LI and HI) have some significant impacts on the order
submission for both the informed and uninformed traders; however, the information
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Table 14. The effect on order profit, information efficiency and bid-
ask spread
Case rI rU MRE s
BM 35.19 -3.51 2.21% 6.24
[4.61] [0.45] [1.37%] [2.91]
LV 12.83* -1.30* 0.77%* 4.77*
[1.17] [0.12] [0.36%] [1.38]
SL 34.89 -3.50 2.42% 5.64
[3.92] [0.39] [1.54%] [2.63]
LB 35.56 -3.55 2.56% 5.96
[4.58] [0.45] [1.60%] [3.54]
LI 67.27* -3.31 3.90%* 4.38*
[15.87] [0.77] [2.42%] [1.26]
HI 15.07* -3.19* 1.00%* 8.53*
[0.64] [0.13] [0.57%] [3.42]
lag (case SL) only affects the order submission of uninformed (not informed) traders
significantly.
As the volatility increases (from κ = 2 in case LV to κ = 4 in the BM case), the
informed traders submit less market orders (MOI) and more aggressive limit orders
(ALOI), while the uninformed traders also submit more aggressive limit orders
(ALOU) but less unaggressive limit orders (ULOU ). Note that the executed limit
orders decrease significantly for the informed traders (see ELOI), but not for the
uninformed traders (see ELOU); also more limit orders from the uninformed traders,
instead of the informed traders, are executed. The result is different from Goettler
et al. (2009) who find that when volatility is higher, informed traders submit more
market orders but less limit orders.
As the number of the informed traders increases (from 5% in case LI to 10% in the
BM and then to 20% in case HI), both the informed and uninformed traders submit
more aggressive limit orders (ALO) but less unaggressive limit orders (ULO) and the
limit orders at quote (LOA); also only the uninformed (not informed) traders submit
less market orders (see MOU). Note that the executed limit orders are reduced for
the informed traders significantly but increased for the uninformed traders with
more limit orders from the uninformed traders are executed. One implication of
this result is that, when the number of informed traders increases, there are more
aggressive limit orders and less market orders and limit orders at or away the quote.
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Table 15. The effect on order submission.
Case MOI ALOI LOAI ULOI ELOI
BM 155 100 172 173 149
[1] [2] [2] [2] [2]
LV 158* 97* 172 174 152*
[2] [2] [2] [1] [2]
SL 156 99 172 174 148
[1] [3] [2] [2] [2]
LB 155 100 171 174 149
[1] [3] [2] [2] [2]
LI 156 98* 173 174 163*
[2] [2] [2] [2] [2]
HI 154 106* 169* 171* 132*
[1] [3] [2] [1] [2]
Case MOU ALOU LOAU ULOU ELOU
BM 169 96 167 168 170
[1] [3] [1] [1] [1]
LV 170 93* 168 170* 170
[1] [2] [1] [1] [1]
SL 165* 96 171* 169* 165*
[2] [3] [2] [1] [1]
LB 169 95 168 169 170
[1] [3] [1] [1] [1]
LI 171* 92* 168* 170* 170
[1] [2] [1] [1] [1]
HI 166* 102* 165* 166* 172*
[1] [3] [2] [1] [1]
Comparing the BM case to case SL, we find that, when the information lag
increases, the uninformed traders submit more market orders (MOU) and less unag-
gressive limit orders (ULOU) and limit orders at quote (LOAU). Also, more limited
orders from the uninformed traders are executed (see ELOU). This implies that,
when the information lag becomes longer, liquidity consumption increases, liquidity
supply decreases and this change in liquidity is mainly from uninformed traders.
Finally, we find that the weight of the recent profit does not have significant impact.
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